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1 Introduction
In most regulated network industries the production of a final good requires the production
of more than one complementary inputs. For example, generation and distribution can
be distinguished as two distinct activities for utilities such as electricity, gas, and water.
Traditionally, final goods were supplied by a regulated vertically integrated monopolist
who produces both inputs. Since the 1980s several countries have introduced or are
considering structural reforms of these industries.
In this setting a regulator makes a choice between vertical separation (VS, henceforth)
and vertical integration (VI, henceforth) of complementary production activities. That
is, either all inputs are produced by one vertically integrated monopolist, or each input
is produced by an independent input supplier. A change of the industry’s organization
changes the incentives of the firms in the industry (Armstrong et al., 1994). In this paper
we study how asymmetric information about the costs of production affects the firms’
incentives, and in effect the optimal organization of regulated production.1 In particular,
we address the following two questions. First, how is the choice affected by correlation of
production costs? Second, how is the choice affected by collusion opportunities between
vertically separated firms?
An example where this analysis could be particularly relevant is in the water industry.
The supply of water involves water collection, treatment, and distribution. Similar pro-
duction stages can be distinguished in the sewage system. The industry often consists of
regulated, local monopolies. Although VI remains the norm in most countries, Garcia et
al. (2006) observe 32 vertically separated utilities (i.e. 17 production, and 15 distribution
utilities) in a balanced panel of 203 class A-C water utilities regulated by the Public Ser-
vice Commission of Wisconsin between 1997 and 2000. Asymmetric information about
labor efficiency created substantial distortions in the output levels (and consumers’ sur-
plus) of class A water utilities in California during the 1980s and 1990s (Wolak, 1994,
Brocas et al., 2006). Moreover, Wolak (1994) finds that his model of asymmetric infor-
mation has a greater explanatory power than a related model of symmetric information.
Labor efficiency is likely to be correlated across inputs. On the one hand, local conditions,
such as education levels, climatic conditions, and geographic diversity, are common shocks
to efficiency. On the other hand, the labor efficiency of each individual input may also
be affected by idiosyncratic shocks, since the production of each particular input needs
1Although our leading example is the incentive regulation of network industries, we would like to
emphasize that our results can also be applied to the internal organization of a multi-divisional firm
which has two divisions producing complementary inputs.
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different, specialized skills.
In our setting, two perfectly complementary inputs are produced. The input cost
parameters (types) are correlated, and have a discrete distribution. Each agent (firm)
has private information about his cost parameter(s). In addition, we assume that the
principal (the regulator) should guarantee the agents a minium rate of return, i.e. break-
even constraints should be satisfied ex post.
First, we characterize the optimal mechanisms in the absence of collusion for a given
organizational choice. The optimal mechanisms are determined by a trade-off between
efficiency and rent extraction. Under VS the optimal quantity schedule is decreasing in
the total cost of production, if correlation is negative or weakly positive, while it is non-
monotonic in the case of strong positive correlation. In the latter case, the rent obtained
by an efficient agent is mainly determined by the quantity produced at the intermediate
state in which one agent is efficient and the other is inefficient. The introduction of a
large downward distortion in the quantity produced at this state of nature enables the
principal to extract the information rent at a relatively low cost of efficiency.
Under VI the principal proposes a menu of contracts to a consolidated agent who has
complete information on both cost parameters (Baron and Besanko, 1992, Dana, 1993,
and Gilbert and Riordan, 1995). This gives a standard single-agent screening problem
with a standard solution. The optimal quantity schedule is always weakly monotonic, and
in particular exhibits partial pooling for intermediate and high total costs of production,
if correlation is positive and very strong.
The optimal organization of production trades off two effects (Mookherjee and Tsuma-
gari, 2004): internalization of bidding externalities and loss of control. Bidding externali-
ties are present under VS when a higher cost reported by one agent modifies the quantity
produced by the other agent, and thus the latter’s rent. For negative or weak positive
correlation the quantity profiles are monotonic, and the externality is negative. A cost
overstatement by one agent reduces the quantity produced, and thereby reduces the rent
that the other agent can obtain by overstating his cost. Under VI such a negative external-
ity is internalized, which makes it less costly to induce truth-telling there. Consequently,
VI dominates VS for negative or weakly positive cost correlation. This result extends
the results found by Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Mookher-
jee and Tsumagari (2004) and Severinov (2005), who focus on the case of independently
distributed types.
Loss of control plays a role when correlation is strongly positive. It represents the fact
that the principal faces a more stringent set of incentive compatibility constraints under VI
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than under VS. The consolidated agent knows both cost parameters and coordinates his
reports, while each agent under VS chooses his cost report independently from the other.
This reduces the set of feasible mechanisms under VI to those with (weakly) monotonic
quantity schedules. When correlation is positive and strong, the quantity schedule under
VI exhibits partial pooling for intermediate and high aggregate costs. Therefore, the
implementation of this schedule under VS does not create bidding externalities. However,
the effect of loss of control is present. When correlation is positive and strong, the optimal
quantity schedule under VS is non-monotonic, which is infeasible under VI. Therefore,
VS dominates VI for strong and positive correlation.
After comparing VI and VS without collusion, we study how the comparison is affected
by introducing collusion under VS. Drawing on the methodology developed by Laffont and
Martimort (1997, 2000), we model collusion under asymmetric information between the
two agents by a side-contract offered by a benevolent and uninformed third-party. The
third-party can use side-payments to implement joint manipulations of reports. In our
setting the agents have the incentive to coordinate their reports in order to internalize
bidding externalities and to acquire more control.
As a benchmark, we consider collusion between vertically separated agents under com-
plete information. Since informed colluding agents have identical incentives and oppor-
tunities as a consolidated agent, we find that VI is equivalent to VS if collusion occurs
under complete information.
As a main result, we show that if collusion occurs under asymmetric information, the
optimal outcome under VS without collusion can be implemented in a collusion-proof way
at (approximately) no loss. This implies that collusion does not affect the choice between
VI and VS as long as it occurs under asymmetric information.
On the one hand, if the quantity schedule under VS without collusion is monotonic
(i.e. correlation is negative or weakly positive), then the optimal mechanism under no
collusion leaves no room for collusion in the sense that, even if agents were completely
informed about the costs, they cannot realize any gain from a joint manipulation of
reports. Therefore, collusion has no effect on the organization of production if correlation
is negative or weakly positive.
On the other hand, if the quantity schedule is non-monotonic (i.e. strongly positive
correlation), then the agents can realize some gain from joint manipulation of reports
if there is complete information between themselves. In other words, there is room for
collusion. In particular, if one agent is efficient and the other is inefficient, the agents have
an incentive to report that both are inefficient. Such a manipulation of reports increases
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the quantity of production, which increases the rent of the efficient agent while it does
not hurt the inefficient agent. However, the fact that the manipulation increases the
production of the inefficient agent creates an incentive problem within the coalition. The
efficient agent’s incentive to pretend to be inefficient to the third-party, who organizes
the coalition, is larger in the presence of the manipulation than in its absence, since
the efficient agent’s rent is increasing in the quantity produced by an inefficient agent.
Therefore, in order to implement the report manipulation, an efficient agent has to receive
a higher rent than he would obtain in the absence of the manipulation. We show that this
additional rent (the transaction cost created by asymmetric information) is larger than
the gains from collusion, implying that the agents fail to collude.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature
studying the choice between VS and VI when two firms produce complementary products
(Baron and Besanko, 1992, Gilbert and Riordan, 1995, Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004
and Severinov, 2005).2 We extend their result that VI dominates VS obtained in the case
of independent types to the case of negative and weak positive correlation. By contrast,
we show that VS dominates VI in the case of strong positive correlation.3 Dana (1993)
compares integration and separation when agents have correlated types and are protected
by ex post break even constraints in a two-type setting. His setting differs from ours in two
ways. In Dana, the produced goods are final goods and are sold in independent markets,
i.e. the products are neither substitutes nor complements. Despite this technological
difference, also he finds that integration dominates separation if and only if correlation is
negative or weakly positive. Moreover, Dana does not consider collusion under separation.
Second, we contribute to the literature studying mechanism design when agents collude
under asymmetric information, pioneered by Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000). In
particular, our paper extends Laffont and Martimort (2000) by considering ex post break-
even constraints. In addition, Laffont and Martimort limit their analysis to the two polar
cases of weak positive correlation and almost perfect positive correlation. Whereas full
rent-extraction emerges without ex post break-even constraints in the absence of collusion
(Crémer and McLean, 1988), Laffont and Martimort show that collusion prevents the
principal from achieving the first-best outcome. However, in their optimal collusion-proof
mechanism, asymmetric information does not generate any transaction cost except in the
2Another related paper is Dequiedt and Martimort (2004), in which one of the input suppliers can
learn the other’s private information at a cost. The paper studies when the buyer wants to induce the
suppliers to share information and coordinate, as opposed to contracting at arm’s length.
3Furthermore, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) and Severinov (2005) consider the case in which two
inputs are substitutes as well and show that VS dominates VI in this case.
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limit case of almost perfect correlation. We show that when the agents are protected by ex
post break-even constraints, collusion is irrelevant since the principal optimally exploits
the transaction costs among colluding firms.
The result that the principal can achieve her payoff without collusion in a collusion-
proof way is also obtained by Pouyet (2002), Jeon (2005), Jeon and Menicucci (2005) and
Che and Kim (2006a). The first three papers follow the methodology of Laffont and Mar-
timort by explicitly characterizing the set of collusion-proof mechanisms in some specific
settings.4 Che and Kim (2006a) use an elegant and constructive approach by presenting
an optimal mechanism which is also collusion-proof in a wide range of settings. However,
they do not allow for ex post break-even constraints and, in correlated environments, they
need to assume that there are at least three agents. As a consequence, their approach
seems to have limited usefulness in our setting under strong positive correlation, in which
the optimal collusion-proof mechanism can be found only by explicitly characterizing the
coalition incentive constraints under asymmetric information, unlike in Che and Kim. Fi-
nally, we focus on collusion in terms of manipulation of reports, as Laffont and Martimort
(1997, 2000) do, and do not consider collusion in terms of coordination of acceptance
or rejection of the principal’s mechanism as some recent papers study (Dequiedt 2004,
Quesada 2004, Pavlov 2004, and Che and Kim 2006b).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model of VS
without collusion. In Section 3, we study the optimal mechanisms under VS, and under
VI, and we compare the two. In Section 4, we study the effect of collusion under VS.
Section 5 concludes the paper. The proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model of vertical separation
This section describes the model of vertical separation (VS). We consider a regulator (the
principal) P and two regulated firms (agents) A1 and A2 producing complementary goods.
The production process consists of two stages, an intermediary and a final stage. In stage
one, A1 produces quantity q ≥ 0 of an intermediate good which is used as input by A2 to
produce in the final stage, using a one-to-one production technology, quantity q of a final
4Pouyet (2002) extends Laffont and Martimort (2000) to the case in which two agents with correlated
types produce perfect substitutes but does not consider ex post break-even constraints. In Jeon (2005)
and Jeon and Menicucci (2005), the agents’ types are independently distributed. The first paper extends
the adverse selection model of Laffont and Martimort (1997) by adding moral hazard (effort). The second
considers a setting of monopolistic screening in which colluding buyers can engage in arbitrage.
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good. The principal chooses the output level q, and the transfers t1 and t2 she gives to
A1 and A2, respectively, to induce them to produce.
Firm Ai, for i ∈ {1, 2}, has a constant marginal cost θi and therefore θiq is his
production cost. Each firm observes privately his marginal cost. We suppose that θ1 and
θ2 are drawn from the common support Θ ≡ {θL, θH}; let ∆ ≡ θH − θL > 0. We say
that an agent with cost θL is an L-type, and an agent with cost θH is an H-type. The
joint distribution of (θ1, θ2) is symmetric, and is common knowledge. For each state of
nature (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ × Θ, let p(θ1, θ2) denote the probability of having the state (θ1, θ2),
with p(θL, θH) = p(θH , θL) in order to make θ1 and θ2 symmetrically distributed. For
expositional simplicity, we introduce the following notation:
p(θL, θL) = pLL, p(θL, θH) = p(θH , θL) = pLH , p(θH , θH) = pHH ,
with pmn > 0 for all m,n ∈ {L,H}, and pLL + 2pLH + pHH = 1. Let p(θ1|θ2) denote the
conditional distribution of θ1 given θ2. We allow θ1 and θ2 to be positively or negatively
correlated, and let ρ ≡ pLLpHH − p2LH represent the degree of correlation.5
Let S(q) denote the consumer surplus from consuming q units of the final good, with
S(q) > 0 > S(q) for any q > 0. In addition, S(q) satisfies the Inada condition S(0) =∞,
limq→+∞ S
(q) = 0.6 The regulator’s objective is given by:7
W ≡ S(q)−
2?
i=1
ti.
According to the revelation principle, we can restrict our attention to direct revelation
grand-mechanisms without loss of generality. A direct grand-mechanism M takes the
following form, in which ?θ
i
is Ai’s report to P about his cost parameter θi:
M =
?
t1(?θ
1
, ?θ
2
), t2(?θ
1
, ?θ
2
), q(?θ
1
, ?θ
2
)
?
.
Since the two agents are ex ante symmetric, we consider only symmetric mechanisms;
this means that we impose t1(θ1, θ2) = t2(θ2, θ1) and q(θ1, θ2) = q(θ2, θ1) for any (θ1, θ2).8
5The independent case is included in our framework as a particular case with measure zero.
6The assumptions S3(0) = ∞ and limq→+∞ S3(q) = 0 jointly imply that that P chooses q > 0 and
finite for any realization of cost parameters (no corner solutions).
7As in Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Mookerjee and Tsumagari (2004), and Severinov (2005), we do
not include the firms’ profits in the objective function.
8This restriction entails no loss of generality since (i) when there is no collusion, one of the optimal
mechanisms is symmetric (the proof is available from the authors); (ii) in the setting with collusion, we
prove below that a suitable symmetric mechanism yields P the same payoff as in the absence of collusion.
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For expositional simplicity, we introduce the following notation: for the transfers,
tLL = t
1(θL, θL) = t2(θL, θL), tLH = t1(θL, θH) = t2(θH , θL),
tHL = t
1(θH , θL) = t2(θL, θH), tHH = t1(θH , θH) = t2(θH , θH);
and for the quantity to produce,
qLL = q(θL, θL), qLH = q(θL, θH) = q(θH , θL) = qHL, qHH = q(θH , θH).
Each agent is risk neutral and his reservation utility is normalized to zero regardless
of his type. After observing θi, Ai should reject or accept the regulator’s offer of a
grand-mechanism. We assume that Ai’s acceptance decision binds and that the grand-
mechanism must satisfy the ex post break-even constraint for any firm, in every state of
nature, under truthful reporting. This condition is formally defined as follows:
ti(θ1, θ2)− θiq(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0 for any (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ×Θ, for i = 1, 2.
Note that when the condition holds, each agent makes a non-negative profit as long as he
reports truthfully, regardless of the report made by the other agent.9 The requirement to
satisfy the ex post break-even constraints can be justified when the regulator is constrained
to guarantee a minimum rate of return in each state of nature. Rate of return regulation
was the norm before price caps or profit sharing were introduced (e.g. see the introduction
in Laffont and Tirole, 1993), and continues to be used in several cases.
The ex post break-even constraints provide the agents with some protection and in
particular allow us to depart from the mechanisms à la Crémer and McLean (1988)
that achieve the first-best outcome whenever the types are correlated. Note that such
mechanisms require P to combine almost infinite rewards with almost infinite penalties
when correlation is very weak, which are rarely observed in reality.
Under VS and without collusion, the timing of the game is given as follows:
1. Nature draws each agent’s cost parameter. Each Ai learns only θi.
9Notice that if there is no collusion, imposing the ex post break-even constraints is equivalent to as-
suming limited liability à la Sappington (1983), in the sense that each agent has the option of terminating
his relationship with P at any time before incurring the production cost, and without paying any fine.
However, this would allow agents to collude on participation once they accepted a grand-mechanism,
while collusion on participation is impossible in our setting since each agent’s acceptance ofM is binding.
It would be interesting to study collusion on participation under limited liability à la Sappington, but
this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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2. The principal proposes a grand-mechanism M .
3. Each agent accepts or rejects M . If at least one agent rejects, both agents get the
reservation utility (zero), and the game ends. Otherwise, the game continues.
4. Each agent Ai makes a report ?θ
i ∈ Θ in M .
5. Production and transfers are enforced according to M .
3 Optimal organization in the absence of collusion
In this section we analyze the optimal organization of production in the absence of collu-
sion. First, we characterize as a benchmark the first-best solution. Second, we analyze the
optimal mechanisms under VS and under VI. Finally, we compare the two mechanisms.
3.1 Benchmark: first-best
If P has complete information about the production costs, then the grand-mechanismM
only needs to satisfy the following ex post break-even constraints (for m,n ∈ {L,H}):
(BEmn) tmn − θmqmn ≡ umn ≥ 0, (1)
where umn is the rent that an m-type earns when the other agent reports an n-type.
Welfare maximization under the ex post break-even constraints yields the following
intuitive first-best solution. First, the first-best transfers extract all rents from the agents,
i.e. uFBmn = 0 for all m,n ∈ {L,H}. Second, the first-best output levels, qFBmn , are efficient,
i.e. S(qFBmn ) = θm + θn for m,n ∈ {L,H}. Finally, an informed principal is indifferent
between VS and VI, since the first-best allocation can be implemented under both.
3.2 Vertical separation
In this section we derive the optimal grand-mechanism under VS when the agents behave
non-cooperatively, and the principal only knows the cost distribution.
Again, the grand-mechanism M should satisfy the ex post break-even constraints
(1) for m,n ∈ {L,H}. In order to induce truth-telling, M should satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints for an m-type (with m,k ∈ {L,H} and k 9= m):
(BICm)
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn
pmL + pmH
(tmn − θmqmn) ≥
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn
pmL + pmH
(tkn − θmqkn) (2)
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The principal maximizes her expected payoffWS below, where the superscript S stands
for separation, subject to (1) and (2) for m,n ∈ {L,H}:
WS =
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn[S(qmn)− tmn − tnm] (3)
The next proposition characterizes the optimal grand-mechanisms under VS when there
is no collusion.
Proposition 1 The optimal grand-mechanism(s) M∗ under VS are as follows:
(i) The optimal quantity schedule (q∗LL, q
∗
LH , q
∗
HH) satisfies S
(q∗mn) = θ
∗
mn, with
θ∗mn =
?
θm +
Pr[θ1 < θm, θ2 = θn]
p(θm, θn)
∆
?
+
?
θn +
Pr[θ1 = θm, θ2 < θn]
p(θm, θn)
∆
?
,
for m,n ∈ {L,H}, and is decreasing (q∗LL > q∗LH ≥ q∗HH) for ρ ≤ ρ∗ ≡ pLH(pHH + pLH),
but non-monotonic (q∗LL > q
∗
HH > q
∗
LH) for ρ > ρ∗.10
(ii) The L-type’s incentive constraint and both the H-type’s ex post break-even con-
straints are binding. The following transfer scheme, for instance, implements the optimal
quantity schedule (with m ∈ {L,H}):
(a) for an H-type: t∗Hm = θHq∗mH;
(b) for an L-type:
t∗Lm = θLq
∗
Lm +∆q
∗
mH , for ρ ≤ ρ∗,
t∗Lm = θLq
∗
Lm +∆q
∗
LH +
pLH
pLL
∆(q∗HH − q∗mH), for ρ > ρ∗.
In both cases, the principal has a residual degree of freedom in the choice of (tLL, tLH).
Since the ex post break-even constraints have to be satisfied, anH-type has to be given
at least zero rent in every state of nature (proposition 1 iia). This forces P to concede
a positive rent to an L-type in order to eliminate this agent’s incentive to exaggerate his
cost, and satisfy the upward incentive constraint (BICL), see proposition 1 (iib). That is,
the mechanisms described by Crémer and McLean (1988), which extract the full surplus
from the agents, are never feasible here.
By using the binding constraints (BEHH), (BEHL) and (BICL) we find the following
total expected rent payment:
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn(umn + unm) = 2pLH
?
pLL
pLH
∆
?
qLH + pHH
?
2
pLH
pHH
∆
?
qHH . (4)
10It may be interesting to note that our case of strong positive correlation ρ > ρ∗ exactly corresponds
to the case of strong positive correlation in Armstrong and Rochet (1999) in which they characterize the
solution of a two-dimensional screening problem. We are grateful to Jean-Charles Rochet for this remark.
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This expression illustrates that the payment of information rents to an L-type increases
the cost of an H-type’s input. In particular, (4) shows that the cost of supplying an extra
unit of input by an H-type in state (θL, θH) equals the unit cost of production θH plus the
unit cost of providing incentives pLL
pLH
∆, i.e. the virtual cost of type H in state (θL, θH) is
θH + pLLpLH∆. Similarly, the marginal cost of supplying the input from an H-type in state
(θH , θH) is increased by pLHpHH∆.
11 This gives P an incentive to reduce the informational
rents by choosing the output levels q∗LH and q
∗
HH below the first-best output levels q
FB
LH
and qFBHH , respectively. Therefore, the optimal quantity schedule is determined by a trade-
off between efficiency and rent extraction. On the other hand, the cost of supplying an
L-type’s input is not affected by rent payments, since the downward incentive constraint
(BICH) is slack in the optimum. Thus, the virtual cost for a type L is simply θL.
The ranking of second-best quantity levels is the reverse of the ranking of the sum of
virtual costs. If correlation is negative or weakly positive (ρ ≤ ρ∗), the optimal quantity
schedule is decreasing in the sum of the two agents’ cost parameters (q∗LL > q
∗
LH ≥ q∗HH).
In the case of strong positive correlation (ρ > ρ∗), instead, the sum of virtual costs is
non-monotonic (i.e. θ∗LL < θ
∗
HH < θ
∗
LH), which yields a non-monotonic quantity schedule:
q∗LL > q
∗
HH > q
∗
LH (see proposition 1 i). If the costs are strongly positively correlated
(i.e. pLH is close to zero), then a large downward distortion in output qLH becomes
profitable for P . A reduction of qLH reduces the expected information rent in (4) and
creates a relatively small expected efficiency loss, since the probability with which the loss
is incurred is close to zero. Intuitively, if pLH is close to zero and an L-type reports θH ,
then his probability to produce qLH is much higher than the probability to produce qHH .
Finally, we notice that Bayesian implementation leaves P one degree of freedom in
choosing (tLL, tLH).12 When ρ ≤ ρ∗, the degree of freedom can be used to find the mecha-
nism described in Proposition 1 that satisfies the following ex post incentive compatibility
constraints (for m,n, k ∈ {L,H}):
tmn − θmqmn ≥ tkn − θmqkn (5)
When the optimal quantity schedule is non-monotonic, instead, it is not possible to satisfy
(1) and (5) for m,n, k ∈ {L,H} within the class of optimal mechanisms. We will show
11Precisely, the cost mark-up depends on the so-called inverse hazard rate for input i. The hazard rate
of input i is the conditional probability of drawing a certain cost value θm for input i given that the cost
of this input is smaller or equal to θm, i.e. hmn ≡ Pr[(θi, θj) = (θm, θn)|θi ≤ θm, θj = θn].
12Bayesian implementation requires that (tLL, tLH) make (BICL) binding and satisfy (BELH), (BELL)
and (BICH).
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later on that the degree of freedom in the choice of (tLL, tLH) turns out to be useful when
agents can collude.
3.3 Vertical integration
In this section we study the optimal mechanism under VI. As in Baron and Besanko
(1992) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995), the vertically integrated firm is represented by
a consolidated agent who has complete information on (θ1, θ2) and maximizes the total
transfer received by the two firms minus the total production cost (θ1 + θ2)q. Thus, the
principal proposes a menu of contracts to the consolidated agent as in a standard single-
agent, one-dimensional screening problem with type θ1 + θ2. We denote this menu as
M I = {(qILL, tILL), (qILH , tILH), (qIHL, tIHL), (qIHH , tIHH)}, in which qILH = qIHL and tILH = tIHL.
The timing of the game under VI is similar to the timing under VS presented in section 2.
Mechanism M I should satisfy the following participation constraints for m,n ∈ {L,H}:
(PCI) tImn − (θm + θn)qImn ≡ uImn ≥ 0. (6)
Note that the ex post break-even constraints are satisfied as long as (PCI) is satisfied
for m,n ∈ {L,H}. M I should also satisfy the following incentive constraints for any
m,n, mˆ, nˆ ∈ {L,H}:
(ICI) uImn ≥ tImˆnˆ − (θm + θn)qImˆnˆ. (7)
The regulator maximizes the following objective subject to (6) and (7):
W I =
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn(S(q
I
mn)− tImn).
The optimal mechanism for this setting is well known in the literature (e.g. see section
3.1 in Laffont and Martimort, 2002), and is characterized below.
Proposition 2 The optimal mechanism under VI is characterized as follows
(a) The optimal quantity schedule (q∗ILL, q
∗I
LH , q
∗I
HH) is such that:
If ρ ≤ ρ∗∗ ≡ pLH(2− pLH), then S(q∗Imn) = θImn, for m,n ∈ {L,H}, with
θImn = θm + θn +
Pr[θ1 + θ2 < θm + θn]
Pr[θ1 + θ2 = θm + θn]
∆
If ρ > ρ∗∗, then S(q∗ILL) = 2θL and S(q∗ILH) = S(q∗IHH) = E
?
θImn
??? θ1 + θ2 9= θL + θL
?
.
(b) The participation constraint of the HH-type and the local upward incentive constraints
bind: t∗IHH = 2θHq∗IHH, t∗ILH = (θL + θH)q∗ILH +∆q∗IHH and t∗ILL = 2θLq∗ILL +∆(q∗ILH + q∗IHH).
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In contrast to the second-best solution under VS, incentive compatibility under VI
implies the monotonicity of the quantity schedule, i.e. q∗ILL ≥ q∗ILH ≥ q∗IHH . The binding in-
centive and participation constraints under VI result in the following expected information
rent payment (proposition 2 b):
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmnu
I
mn = 2pLH
?
pLL
2pLH
∆
?
qILH + pHH
?
1− pHH
pHH
∆
?
qIHH , (8)
The right hand side of this expression illustrates the virtual cost mark-up under VI,
as the right hand side of (4) for the case of VS. Now the mark-up is related to the
hazard rate of the sum of costs. In particular, the monotonicity constraint binds when
θILH > θ
I
HH , which is equivalent to ρ > ρ∗∗, and in this case we have S(q∗ILH) = S(q∗IHH) =
2pLH
1−pLLθ
I
LH +
pHH
1−pLLθ
I
HH (proposition 2 a).
3.4 Vertical separation versus vertical integration
In this section we examine the principal’s choice between VS and VI. Consolidating two
agents into a single agent has two effects (see e.g. Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004):
internalization of bidding externalities and loss of control. First, under VS independent
reporting by agents creates bidding externalities. Specifically, a higher cost reported by
one agent modifies the quantity produced by the other agent if he also exaggerates his
cost, and thereby changes his rent from reporting untruthfully. Under VI the consolidated
agent internalizes this externality. Second, under VI the principal faces a more stringent
set of incentive compatibility constraints than under VS (loss of control). The consolidated
agent knows (θ1, θ2) and exercises complete control over reporting, while each separated
agent has only partial control. This reduces the set of feasible mechanisms under VI. The
trade-off between these two effects determines the optimal organization of production,
which is characterized below.
Proposition 3 (i) The principal prefers VI if ρ ≤ ρ∗ while she prefers VS if ρ ≥ ρ∗∗. If
ρ∗ < ρ < ρ∗∗, her preference between VS and VI depends on S(·).
(ii) Suppose that S(q) = aq− b
2
q2 with a(> 0) sufficiently large and b > 0. Then there
exists a ?ρ ≡ pLH
3
(4− 3pLH − 2pLL) ∈ (ρ∗, ρ∗∗) such that the principal prefers VI to VS if
and only if ρ < ?ρ.
First, if ρ ≤ ρ∗, then the optimal quantity schedule (q∗LL, q∗LH , q∗HH) under VS, described
by Proposition 1, is implementable under VI. Therefore, there is no effect from loss of
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control. However, the effect from internalization of bidding externalities is present and
positive. If an L-type agent exaggerates his cost, then this reduces the gain from cost
exaggeration by the other agent, since the quantity schedule is monotonic. Under VI
the consolidated agent internalizes this negative externality, which enables the principal
to save informational rents. More formally, we illustrate the difference in expected rent
payments under VS and VI for implementing a schedule (qLL, qLH , qHH) by taking the
difference between (4) and (8):
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn(umn + unm − uImn) = pLL(qLH − qHH)∆ (9)
For a low cost correlation, the optimal quantity schedule under VS is monotonic (i.e.
q∗LH > q
∗
HH) and can be implemented under VI at a lower cost since the expected rent
difference in (9) is positive. This implies that VI dominates VS.
Second, if ρ ≥ ρ∗∗, then the optimal quantity schedule under VI can be implemented
under VS. In this case the effect from internalization of bidding externalities is not present.
If an L-type agent exaggerates his cost, then this does not affect the gain from cost
exaggeration by the other agent, since q∗ILH and q
∗I
HH are equal (see proposition 2 a). The
equality of expected rent payments under VS and VI is illustrated in (9), which is zero for
q∗ILH = q
∗I
HH . However, the effect from loss of control is negative for VI. The principal can
reach a higher payoff by choosing a non-monotonic quantity schedule under VS, which is
infeasible under VI.13 Therefore, VS dominates VI for ρ ≥ ρ∗∗.
Finally, if ρ∗ < ρ < ρ∗∗, both effects emerge. On the one hand, it is less expensive
to implement the monotonic schedule (q∗ILL, q
∗I
LH , q
∗I
HH) under VI than under VS, i.e. the
effect from internalizing bidding externalities is positive. On the other hand, the principal
can enhance her payoff under VS by choosing a schedule that is infeasible under VI, i.e.
the effect from loss of control is negative. The trade-off between these two conflicting
effects makes the general comparison ambiguous. Proposition 3(ii) shows that in the case
of quadratic surplus function, there is a cut-off level of correlation ?ρ between ρ∗ and ρ∗∗
such that VI dominates VS if and only if ρ < ?ρ.
13For example, when the correlation is almost perfect (i.e. pLH * 0), the principal can almost achieve
the first-best outcome under VS by choosing q∗LH close to zero. By contrast, under VI, the principal
cannot get close to the first-best, since a consolidated agent with cost 2θL would have an incentive to
report 2θH and obtain a rent of 2∆qFBHH > 0.
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4 Vertical separation and collusion
In this section we study the optimal mechanism under VS when the agents collude and
investigate how collusion affects the comparison between VS and VI.
4.1 Coalition formation and timing
We model collusion between A1 and A2 by a (direct) side-contract S offered by a benevo-
lent and uninformed third-party, T (e.g. see Laffont and Martimort, 1997, 2000).14 Given
M designed by P , the third-party maximizes the sum of the agents’ rents by implementing
joint manipulations of reports into M subject to incentive compatibility constraints, ex
post break-even constraints, and acceptance constraints that induce the agents to accept
S instead of playingM non-cooperatively. In order to satisfy these constraints, T can use
balanced side transfers between the agents.
A side-contract contains two elements. First, the manipulation of report function,
φ(·), maps any pair of reports made by the agents to T (in S) into the set of (possibly
stochastic) reports to P (in M). Second element is a monetary side-transfer, yi(·), from
Ai to T . Since T is not a source of money, the following budget balance constraints must
hold:
2?
i=1
yi(θ1, θ2) = 0, for any (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ×Θ.
Thus, the side-contract takes the following form, where ?θ
i
is Ai’s report to T about θi:
S =
?
φ(?θ
1
, ?θ
2
), y1(?θ
1
, ?θ
2
), y2(?θ
1
, ?θ
2
)
?
.
We assume that S must satisfy the following ex post break-even constraints:15
ti(φ(θ1, θ2))− yi(θ1, θ2)− θiq(φ(θ1, θ2)) ≥ 0 for any (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ×Θ. (10)
14Any outcome of an extensive form game of bargaining can be achieved by a side-contract designed
by such a third-party. Hence, our modelling strategy is a shortcut which characterizes the upperbound
of what can be achieved by collusion.
15This assumption allows us to capture a situation in which both P and T face similar constraints.
This is important because if T does not need to satisfy ex post break-even constraints while P does, then
the weakly collusion-proofness principle below does not apply. Therefore, there may be outcomes which
P can achieve by letting collusion occur, but cannot achieve in a collusion-proof way; in short, collusion
may be beneficial to P . A setting in which collusion is beneficial is theoretically interesting, but we think
that it is not very relevant in our regulatory context.
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The constraints can be justified by financial constraints for the firms. Assume that the
firms have no assets to start with and cannot borrow money to cover a loss (as in Laffont
andMartimort, 2002, p.296). Then a firm is forced to default on the grand-mechanism and
produce nothing if S violates (10). As a consequence, the firm will face sanctions from the
regulator in addition to losing its reputation. Furthermore, the default can be regarded
as evidence of collusion (recall that M satisfies the ex post break-even constraints). As
collusion is illegal, the default would provoke criminal investigations and the managers
of the firms might be imprisoned. Since the third party wants to maximize the firms’
payoffs, he will not design S which violates (10). An alternative justification is based on
limited enforceability of S. More precisely, suppose that the manager of a firm can renege
ex post on the side-contract if respecting the latter’s terms makes his firm incur a loss (see
e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 2002, p.64). In this situation, by reneging on S and playing
M , the firm can get a non-negative profit and hence the manager’s temptation to renege
is strong.
The timing of the game with collusion under VS is as before, except that stage 4 is
replaced by the following steps:
4(a). The third-party offers a side-contract S.
4(b). Each agent accepts or rejects S.
4(c). If both agents accept S, then each agent reports to T (in S) and subsequently side-
transfers to T and reports to P (in M) are enforced according to S. Otherwise, M
is played non-cooperatively and reports are made directly to P (in M).
4.2 Benchmark: collusion under complete information
In this subsection we study the benchmark of collusion under complete information. For
this purpose, we consider the timing described in the previous subsection but assume
that the third-party knows the true type of each agent, as in Baron and Besanko (1999).
Therefore, a side-mechanism does not need to satisfy any incentive constraint. Once a
side-contract is accepted by both agents, they will behave as if they were one consolidated
agent. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the set of direct
mechanisms inducing truth-telling of the consolidated agent. This implies that a grand-
mechanism should satisfy the following coalition incentive constraint
tmn + tnm − (θm + θn)qmn ≥ tmˆnˆ + tnˆmˆ − (θm + θn)qmˆnˆ (11)
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for every state of nature, that is form,n ∈ {L,H} and mˆ, nˆ ∈ {L,H}. This is a condition
analogous to (7), but it applies to a mechanism M rather than to a menu of contracts
M I . Moreover, the ex post break-even constraints (10) together with truth-telling and
budget balance imply the participation constraint
tmn + tnm − (θm + θn)qmn ≥ 0
for m,n ∈ {L,H}; this is a condition analogous to (6).
Therefore, P ’s expected payoff under VS with collusion cannot be higher than the
payoff under VI. In fact, P can achieve the expected payoff of VI when the agents collude
under complete information by choosing the following grand-mechanism.
MC :
qCmn = q
∗I
mn, t
C
mm =
1
2
t∗Imm, for m,n ∈ {L,H},
tCHL = θHq∗ILH , tCLH = t∗ILH − tCHL.
The grand-mechanism MC is incentive feasible, and implements the optimal quantity
schedule under VI by paying the same sum of transfers to the agents as under VI. There-
fore, P achieves the same expected payoff throughMC as under VI, which we state below.
Proposition 4 If vertically separated agents can collude under complete information,
then VS is equivalent to VI.
4.3 Weak collusion proofness
In the rest of this section we consider collusion under asymmetric information. In this
subsection we define weak collusion proofness, and show that P cannot gain from designing
a grand mechanism which is not weakly collusion-proof.
After T proposes S, a two-stage game is played between A1 and A2. First, the agents
accept or refuse S (stage 4b), and then they report either to P or to T depending on
their previous acceptance decisions (stage 4c). We call this two-stage game the game
of coalition formation. We are interested in Perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game in
which both agents accept S, i.e. there is no learning about types along the equilibrium
path. However, before accepting or rejecting S, an agent needs to know what is going to
happen off-the equilibrium path. As in Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000), we assume
the following about off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs and events.
Assumption WCP (weak collusion proofness) Given an incentive compatible M , if
Ai rejects S (an off-the-equilibrium-path event) then the other agent still has prior beliefs
about θi and the truthful equilibrium is played in M .
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In order to define weakly collusion-proof grand mechanisms, we need to introduce
some definitions. We let U•m (m = L,H) denote the expected payoff of an m-type in
the truthful equilibrium of M . Thus, U•m plays the role of the reservation utility for an
m-type when he decides whether to accept S or not. Let φmn and yimn denote φ(θm, θn)
and yi(θm, θn), respectively, for m,n ∈ {L,H} and i = 1, 2.
Definition 1 A side-contract S• = {φ•(·), y1•(·), y2•(·)} is coalition-interim-efficient with
respect to a grand-mechanism M = {t1(·), t2(·), q(·)} providing the reservation utilities
{U•L, U•H} if and only if it is a solution of the following program:
max
φ,y1,y2
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn[t
1(φmn) + t
2(φmn)− (θm + θn)q(φmn)] (12)
subject to
U1m =
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn
pmL + pmH
[t1(φmn)− y1mn − θmq(φmn)], for any m ∈ {L,H};
U2m =
?
n∈{L,H}
pnm
pLm + pHm
[t2(φnm)− y2nm − θmq(φnm)], for any m ∈ {L,H};
(BIC1S) U1m ≥
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn
pmL + pmH
[t1(φkn)− y1kn − θmq(φkn)], for any m,k ∈ {L,H};
(BIC2S) U2m ≥
?
n∈{L,H}
pnm
pLm + pHm
[t2(φnk)− y2nk − θmq(φnk)], for any m,k ∈ {L,H};
(BIRS) U im ≥ U•m, for any m ∈ {L,H};
(BB) y1mn + y
2
nm = 0, for any m,n ∈ {L,H};
(Ex post BE)
t1(φmn)− y1mn − θmq(φmn) ≥ 0
t2(φnm)− y1nm − θmq(φnm) ≥ 0
, for any m,n ∈ {L,H}.
A side-contract is coalition-interim-efficient if it maximizes the sum of the agents’
expected profits subject to incentive, acceptance, budget balance, and ex post break-
even constraints. The acceptance constraint (BIRS) is defined in Bayesian terms and
guarantees that Ai’s payoff by accepting S is not smaller than the reservation utility U•m
he obtains by playing M non-cooperatively if S is rejected.
Definition 2 The null side-contract S0 is the side-contract where there is no manipula-
tion of report (φ(·) = Id(·)) and no side transfers between agents (y1(·) = y2(·) = 0).
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If the third party chooses S = S0, then M is not affected by collusion since S0
implements no manipulation of reports. This motivates the following definition of weakly
collusion-proof grand-mechanisms.
Definition 3 An incentive compatible grand-mechanismM providing the reservation util-
ities {U•L, U•H} is said to be weakly collusion-proof when S0 is coalition-interim-efficient
with respect to M .
We are now able to state a result which allows us to restrict attention to weakly
collusion proof mechanisms.
Proposition 5 There is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to offer weakly
collusion-proof mechanisms to characterize the outcome of any perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria of the game of grand-mechanism offer cum coalition formation such that a collusive
equilibrium occurs on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 5 states that all the outcomes that can be implemented by allowing collu-
sion to happen can be mimicked by P in a collusion-proof way and implies that P cannot
realize a higher payoff when the agents can collude than when they do not. Indeed, when
T proposes S0, (i) Ex post BE and the Bayesian incentive constraints (BICS) in the side
mechanism reduce to (1) and (2) for m,n ∈ {L,H}, respectively; (ii) the acceptance con-
straints (BIRS) are automatically satisfied with equality. Hence, under collusion, P needs
to choose M to maximize her payoff subject to (1)-(2) for m,n ∈ {L,H}, and the con-
ditions that make M weakly collusion-proof.16 Since collusion imposes extra constraints
on P ’s optimization problem, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under VS, the principal’s payoff when agents can collude under asymmetric
information is never larger than the payoff without collusion.
This corollary gives an upper bound for P ’s payoff. In the next subsection we show
that it is possible to (almost) reach this upper bound.
4.4 The optimal weakly collusion proof mechanism
We first state the results.
16These are the conditions which deter manipulations of reports. The conditions are explained later
on in this section and, with more details, in the proof of Proposition 6.
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Proposition 6 Consider VS and suppose that the agents can collude under asymmetric
information and that ∆ is sufficiently small when ρ > ρ∗. Then, for any given ρ, there
exists a grand mechanism which is both optimal (or almost optimal) in the absence of
collusion and weakly collusion proof: M  if ρ ≤ ρ∗ and M (ε) with ε(> 0) close to 0 if
ρ > ρ∗. This mechanism is essentially unique if ρ > ρ∗.17
We will defineM  andM (ε) later on. The proposition states that under VS, collusion
does not hurt P . Therefore, we get the following result:
Proposition 7 Suppose that under VS, the agents can collude under asymmetric infor-
mation and that ∆ is sufficiently small when ρ > ρ∗. Then, for any given ρ, the principal’s
preference between VS and VI is not affected by the agents’ ability to collude under VS,
and is described by Proposition 3.
In what follows, we explain the result of Proposition 6 with minimum technical details.
We distinguish the case of ρ ≤ ρ∗ from the case of ρ > ρ∗. In each case, we provide a
weakly collusion-proof optimal mechanism.
4.4.1 The case of ρ ≤ ρ∗
If ρ ≤ ρ∗, one optimal collusion-proof mechanism M  is defined below; notice that M 
differs from M∗ in Proposition 1 only in terms of tLL and tLH .
M  :
qmn = q
∗
mn, t

Hn = t
∗
Hn, for all m,n ∈ {L,H},
tLL = t
∗
LL − XpLL , t

LH = t
∗
LH +
X
pLH
, with X ≡ pLLpLH
1−pHH (q
∗
LH − q∗HH)∆
By Proposition 1,M  is optimal in the absence of collusion. Furthermore, it is easy to see
that M  satisfies (11). This implies that the objective function (12) for the third party
is maximized by truth-telling (i.e., by φ(.) = Id) and thus the null side mechanism S0 is
coalition-interim-efficient because it is feasible and maximizes (12). This shows thatM  is
weakly collusion proof. Basically, when the quantity schedule is monotonic, P can use
the residual degree of freedom in the choice of (tLL, tLH) to satisfy (11) without incurring
any additional cost.
When a mechanismM violates (11), we say thatM exhibits room for collusion because
some manipulation of reports would occur if (θ1, θ2) were complete information among
the agents. We have shown that M  leaves no room for collusion when ρ ≤ ρ∗.
17The mechanism is essentially unique in the sense it is unique given ε, and it is profitable to choose ε
close to 0. However, as we shall explain below, M 33(0) is not collusion-proof.
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4.4.2 The case of ρ > ρ∗
When ρ > ρ∗, we can easily see that if a grand-mechanismM is optimal under no collusion,
then it leaves room for collusion. The optimal quantity schedule under VS in the absence
of collusion is such that q∗LH < q
∗
HH when ρ > ρ∗. However, P cannot implement a non-
monotonic quantity schedule and satisfy (11), since incentive compatibility in a one-agent
setting implies that the monotonicity condition qLH ≥ qHH must be satisfied as we have
seen in the case of VI.18
The fact that any mechanism M that is optimal in the absence of collusion leaves
room for collusion does not necessarily imply that collusion reduces the payoff of the
principal. Since the agents collude under asymmetric information, they have to solve an
incentive problem within the coalition. This may make it impossible for them to exploit
the potential gain from collusion. Indeed, as long as ∆ is sufficiently small, we can find
M (ε) which is (almost) optimal in the absence of collusion and weakly collusion proof,
even though it fails to satisfy (11). Precisely, consider
M (ε) :
qmn = q
∗
mn, t

HL = t
∗
HL + ε, tHH = t∗HH
tLL = θLq∗LL +∆q∗HH + ε, tLH = θLq∗LH +∆q∗HH −
pLL
pLH
∆(q∗HH − q∗LH)
with ε(> 0) small. The assumption that ∆ is small implies that q∗HH is close enough to
q∗LH thatM
(ε) satisfies break-even constraint (BELH). We notice thatM (0) is optimal
under no collusion (by Proposition 1) but M (ε) is not so. However, we explain below
that M (ε) is weakly collusion proof, unlike M (0). The difference of expected payoff for
P between M (0) and M (ε) is 2(pLL + pLH)ε. Since ε can be chosen arbitrarily small,
the supremum of P ’s payoff when agents can collude is equal to her payoff when agents
cannot collude.
We can get some intuition for the weak collusion proofness of M (ε) by analyzing
the incentive and acceptance constraints of a side-contract. In the side-contract that is
optimal with respect toM (ε), the incentive constraint (BICSL) is binding. In particular,
the information rent of an L-type, which gives him an incentive to report truthfully to T ,
increases with the quantity produced by an H-type. Therefore, T evaluates an H-type’s
input at a virtual cost which is larger than the real cost θH . This can create distortions
in T ’s decisions to manipulate reports (compared to the case in which the manipulation
decisions are taken under complete information), as we explain below.
18Precisely, if ρ > ρ∗, then mechanism M∗ in Proposition 1 violates (11) for θ1 + θ2 = θL + θH , and
?θ1 + ?θ2 = 2θH .
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As in the design of M by P , the virtual cost of an L-type agent in the design of S is
equal to his real cost θL. Therefore, T has no incentive to manipulate the cost reports
of an LL coalition if and only if the following coalition incentive constraints (CIC) are
satisfied:
(CICLL,LH) 2tLL − 2θLqLL ≥ tHL + tLH − 2θLqLH ; (13)
(CICLL,HH) 2tLL − 2θLqLL ≥ 2tHH − 2θLqHH . (14)
It can be verified that M (ε) satisfies both constraints.
For an LH coalition, the coalition incentive constraints can be written as follows:
(CICLH,LL) tHL + tLH − (θL + θH + μLH)qLH ≥ 2tLL − (θL + θH + μLH)qLL (15)
(CICLH,HH) tHL + tLH − (θL + θH + μLH)qLH ≥ 2tHH − (θL + θH + μLH)qHH(16)
where θL + θH + μLH is the virtual cost of production in state (θL, θH) from the point of
view of T . We show in the proof of Proposition 6 that since (BICL) binds in M (ε), P
can choose μLH in [0,
pLL
pLH
∆). We notice that if μLH is close to
pLL
pLH
∆, then θL+ θH +μLH
is close to θ∗LH , the virtual cost in state (θL, θH) from P ’s point of view when there is no
collusion. Although, M (0) satisfies (CICLH,LL) strictly and (CICLH,HH) with equality
if μLH =
pLL
pLH
∆, M (0) is actually not weakly collusion proof because the value pLL
pLH
∆
is not feasible for μLH . In M (ε) we add a small but positive ε to tHL and to tLL (so
that (BICL) is still binding), and thus (15)-(16) are satisfied for μLH smaller than
pLL
pLH
∆
but close to this value. Furthermore, in the proof of proposition 6 we show that M (ε)
satisfies all the coalition incentive constraints for an HH coalition. Thus, we conclude
that M (ε) is weakly collusion proof.
We notice that if μLH = 0 then (CICLH,LL) and (CICLH,HH) are identical to (11)
with m = L, n = H. In that case, M (ε) satisfies (CICLH,LL) but violates (CICLH,HH).
The fact that M (ε) violates (CICLH,HH) if μLH = 0 means that there is a potential
gain from manipulating reports from LH to HH. However, when the agents collude
under asymmetric information, P can induce T to evaluate the production cost of an LH
coalition in terms of a virtual cost which is larger than the real cost θL + θH and close to
θ∗LH . This in turn penalizes a manipulation that increases the quantity produced by the
coalition from q∗LH to q
∗
HH , and the third party finds the manipulation not profitable.
Alternatively, we can explain the failure to implement a report manipulation from
LH to HH by comparing the gains from the manipulation and the transaction costs
of implementing the manipulation. Given M (ε), consider a side-contract S with ma-
nipulation of reports φ(θL, θH) = φ(θH , θL) = (θH , θH), and no joint manipulation
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otherwise. Since the agents are ex ante symmetric, we restrict ourselves without loss
of generality to a symmetric side-contract S. Hence, S specifies a side-payment ?y
from an L-type to an H-type only when the agents announce (θL, θH) or (θH , θL) to
T . On the one hand, the expected cost of implementing S can be computed as fol-
lows. First, the acceptance constraint of an H-type agent puts a lower bound on the
side-payment ?y. The acceptance constraint (BIRSH ) requires that the H-type agen-
t’s expected profit from accepting S, pLH
pLH+pHH
?y, is greater than or equal to his ex-
pected profit in the absence of collusion, U•H =
pLH
pLH+pHH
ε, which gives ?y ≥ ε. The
expected payoff of an L-type agent from overstating his cost to the third party, given
truthful reporting by the other agent, equals: ∆q∗HH +
pLL
pLL+pLH
?y, which is at least
∆q∗HH +
pLL
pLL+pLH
ε. Since the payoff of an L-type agent in the truthful equilibrium of
M  (ε) is U•L = ∆q∗HH +
pLL
pLL+pLH
[ε − ∆(q∗HH − q∗LH)], we conclude that the implemen-
tation of S increases an L-type’s rent by at least pLL
pLL+pLH
∆(q∗HH − q∗LH). Therefore,
the expected rent increase paid by T is greater than or equal to 2pLL∆(q∗HH − q∗LH),
which we define as the transaction costs in side-contracting generated by asymmet-
ric information. On the other hand, the expected gain from manipulating the reports
through S is 2pLH [2tHH − (θH + θL)q∗HH − (tLH + tHL − (θH + θL)q∗LH)], which equals:
2pLL∆(q∗HH − q∗LH)− 2pLHε. Since the gains from the manipulation are smaller than the
transaction costs, the manipulation cannot be implemented.19
In summary, only the rules that give an L-type more than the whole gains from
collusion are incentive compatible within the coalition. This makes collusion fail because
there is not enough left to compensate H-type’s loss from the manipulation. Therefore, P
can implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a collusion-proof way. In contrast, if
collusion takes place under complete information, P cannot implement a non-monotonic
quantity schedule.
4.5 Ratifiability
In the game of coalition formation, after S0 is proposed by the third party, a two stage
game starts. In the first stage each Ai accepts or rejects S0; in the second stage, agents
report types either in M if some agent vetoed S0,20 or in S0 otherwise. In any case,
19Given the inequality ?y33 ≥ ε derived from (BIRS??H ), a simpler (but perhaps less insightful) way to see
that the manipulation from LH to HH cannot be implemented exploits (BICS
??
L ), which is pLL(∆q∗HH +
ε)+ pLH(∆q∗HH − ?y33) ≥ pLL(∆q∗HH + ?y33)+ pLH∆q∗HH , or pLLpLL+pLH ε ≥ ?y
33. Since pLLpLL+pLH ε < ε, we infer
that (BICS
??
L ) and/or (BIR
S??
H ) is violated.
20Here we use M to represent M 3 when ρ ≤ ρ∗ and M 33(ε) when ρ > ρ∗.
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however,M is actually played in the second stage since S0 is the null side mechanism; the
first stage is therefore a sort of cheap-talk stage in which agents may signal their types.
We introduced above assumption WCP, under which the truthful Bayesian equilibrium
(BNE) of M , supported by prior beliefs, is played when S0 is vetoed. However, Ai’s
acceptance decision of S0 may be affected if he expects the other agent to infer non-prior
beliefs from his veto of S0. We use here the notion of strong ratifiability of a mechanism
against itself provided by Cramton and Palfrey (1995) to test whether M  or M  (ε) is
robust to the pre-play announcements at the first stage. In presenting ratifiability we
follow Laffont and Martimort (2000) and suppose without loss of generality that it is A1
the agent who contemplates rejecting S0.
It is useful to introduce the following notation. We use σ to denote a generic strategy
profile in M ; σ = (LH,LL), for example, is the (pure-strategy) profile in which both
types of A1 report truthfully and A2 always claims L; σ• = (LH,LH) is the truthful
reporting profile. Let p¯ represent a belief system of A2 about θ1 which may differ from
the prior beliefs p. More clearly, p¯(θm|θn) is the probability that A2 attaches, according
to the belief system p¯, to the event θ1 = θm given that his own type is n (m,n ∈ {L,H});
p¯(θm|θn) may differ from the prior belief p(θm|θn). Let BNE(Mp¯,p) represent the set of
BNE of M when A1 has prior beliefs about θ2 and A2’s beliefs about θ1 are given by
p¯. Clearly, M is incentive compatible if and only if σ• ∈ BNE(Mp,p). Finally, let Aim
denote Ai having type m ∈ {L,H}, U im(σ) denote the payoff of Aim when σ is played in
M , computed with prior beliefs; we have already introduced U•j ≡ U1j (σ•) = U2j (σ•) as
the payoff in the truthful BNE.
Definition 4 Given an incentive compatibleM , a belief system p¯ is a credible veto system
of σ• if there exists σ ∈ BNE(Mp¯,p) and refusal probabilities rm (m ∈ {L,H}) for A1
such that rL + rH > 0 and
(i) p¯(θm|θn) = p(θm|θn)rmp(θL|θn)rL+p(θH |θn)rH , for m,n ∈ {L,H}
(ii) rm = 1 for anym such that U1m(σ) > U•m and rm = 0 for anym such that U1m(σ) < U•m.
Thus, A2’s beliefs following a rejection of A1 are required to satisfy a consistency
condition similar to the one underlying the definition of perfect sequential equilibrium in
Grossman and Perry (1986). In words, the non-deviant A2 rationalizes a veto of A1 by
finding beliefs about θ1 which are consistent with A1’s incentive to veto. In our context,
if A1 vetoes S0 then he is actually vetoing σ•. Hence, A2 should infer that A1’s type is m
such that A1m will improve his own payoff with respect to U•m by not playing σ• inM ; if it
is common knowledge that σ is played in M after a veto of A1, that means U1m(σ) > U•m.
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On the other hand, typesm of A1 who are going to lose if σ is played [U1m(σ) < U•j ] should
not have vetoed σ•; thus they receive zero probability in the revised beliefs of A2. The
belief system p¯ of A2 about θ1 is consistent with Bayesian updating given the prior beliefs
and the above argument, as embodied in refusal probabilities. Observe that σ is required
to be a BNE of M when A2 updated his beliefs about θ1 as indicated above. The set of
types m satisfying rm > 0 is called credible veto set.
Definition 5 An incentive compatible M is strongly ratifiable if no credible veto system
exists or if, for any given credible veto system p¯ and associated credible veto set, there
exists σˆ ∈ BNE(Mp¯,p) such that U1m(σˆ) = U•m for any m in the credible veto set.
The next proposition establishes that M  when ρ ≤ ρ∗ and M (ε) when ρ > ρ∗ are
strongly ratifiable, although for different reasons.
Proposition 8 (i) When ρ ≤ ρ∗, M  is strongly ratifiable because no credible veto system
exists.
(ii) When ρ > ρ∗, there exists a unique credible veto systems for M  (ε): the credible veto
set is {θL}, (rL, rH) = (1, 0), p¯(θL|θL) = p¯(θL|θH) = 1, p¯(θH |θL) = p¯(θH |θH) = 0 and
σ = (HH,HH). However, σ• is a BNE of M p¯,p (ε), U1L(σ•) = U•L and thus M  (ε) is
strongly ratifiable because σ• plays the role of σˆ in definition 5.
The proof of Proposition 8(i) shows that, givenM  and ρ ≤ ρ∗, there exists no behavior
of A2 (let alone an equilibrium) which allows A1m to earn more than U
•
m for some m ∈
{L,H}. Thus, there is no credible veto system. In the case of ρ > ρ∗ and M (ε), there
exists a credible veto set and it separates L-type from H-type; the associated BNE of
M p¯,p (ε) is σ ≡ (HH,HH) such that all types report θH . However, truth-telling is still a
BNE in M p¯,p (ε) and U1L(σ•) = U•L because A1L has prior beliefs on θ
2. This makes M  (ε)
strongly ratifiable by definition 5.
Although Proposition 8 establishes that M  and M  (ε) are strongly ratifiable, σ¯ ≡
(HH,HH) is a BNE of M p,p (ε) for ρ > ρ∗ and thus, even though each agent accepts S0,
the profile σ¯ is an equilibrium when S0 is played. It turns out that there is no Pareto
dominance between σ¯ and σ•,21 but σ¯ is the unique profile that survives iterated deletion
of weakly dominated strategies in M  (ε).22 We notice that the optimal collusion proof
21An L type’s payoff is larger in σ¯ than in σ•, but the opposite is true for an H type.
22Truthtelling is strictly dominant for an H type. If A1L and A
2
L have prior beliefs, as they do after
unanimous acceptance of S0, then A1L is indifferent between reporting L and H if A
2
L plays L (given that
A2H chooses H). If instead A
2
L plays H with positive (even small) probability, then A
1
L strictly prefers
reporting H to reporting L and a similar argument applies to A2L.
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mechanism in Laffont and Martimort (2000) under strong and positive correlation has the
same multiplicity problem as M (ε), even though they do not analyze ratifiability and
multiplicity when correlation is strong and positive correlation.23
5 Conclusion
We considered the regulation of firms producing complementary inputs and studied how
correlation of the firms’ cost parameters and collusion (under VS) affects the organiza-
tional choice between VI and VS when the firms are protected by ex post break-even
constraints. First, we found that VI dominates VS for a negative or weakly positive
correlation since VI internalizes negative bidding externalities. On the other hand, VS
dominates VI for strong positive correlation because of the loss of control effect, i.e. the
principal has an incentive to implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule, but can only
do so under VS. Second, when the agents collude under complete information, we found
that VS is equivalent to VI. Finally, when the agents collude under asymmetric infor-
mation, collusion does not affect the principal’s payoff under VS and therefore does not
affect comparison between VI and VS. In particular, when there is strong positive cor-
relation, the principal can implement the non-monotonic optimal quantity schedule in a
collusion-proof way, which is impossible if collusion occurs under complete information.
References
Armstrong, M., S. Cowan, and J. Vickers. 1994. “Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis
and British Experience.” Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
Armstrong, M. and J.-C. Rochet. 1999. “Multidimensional Screening: A User’s guide.”
European Economic Review, 43: 959-979.
Baron, D. and D. Besanko. 1992. “Information, Control, and Organizational Structure.”
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1 (2): 237-275.
Baron, D. and D. Besanko. 1999. “Informational Alliances.” Review of Economic Studies,
66 (4): 743-768.
Brocas, I., K. Chan, and I. Perrigne. 2006. “Regulation under Asymmetric Information
in Water Utilities.” American Economic Review, 96 (2): 62-66.
23Che and Kim (2006a) consider neither ratifiability nor multiplicity in their analysis.
25
Che, Y.-K. and J. Kim. 2006a. “Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation.” Economet-
rica, 74 (4): 1063-1107.
Che, Y.-K. and J. Kim. 2006b. “Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions.”, mimeo, Columbia
University.
Cramton, P., and T.R. Palfrey. 1995. “Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagree-
ment.” Games and Economic Behavior, 10: 255-283.
Crémer, J. and R. McLean. 1988. “Full Extraction of surplus in Bayesian and Dominant
Strategy Auctions.” Econometrica, 56: 1247-1258.
Dana, J. D. 1993, “The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct
Industries.” Journal of Economic Theory, 59: 288-310.
Dequiedt, V. 2004. “Optimal Collusion and Optimal Auctions.” Working Paper, INRA-
GAEL University of Grenoble.
Dequiedt, V. and D. Martimort. 2004. “Delegated Monitoring Versus Arm’s-Length
Contracting.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22: 951-981.
Garcia, S., M. Moreaux, and A. Reynaud. 2006. “Measuring Economies of Vertical
Integration in Network Industries: An Application to the Water Sector.” International
Journal of Industrial Organization, forthcoming.
Gilbert, R. and M. Riordan. 1995. “Regulating Complementary Products: A Compara-
tive Institutional Analysis.” Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (2): 243-256.
Grossman, S., and M. Perry. 1986. “Perfect Sequential Equilibrium,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 39: 97-119.
Jeon, D.-S. 2005. “Mechanism Design under Collusion and Uniform Transfers.” Journal
of Public Economic Theory, 7 (4): 641-667.
Jeon, D.-S. and D. Menicucci. 2005. “Optimal Second-degree Price Discrimination and
Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among Buyers.” Rand Journal of
Economics, 36(2).
Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort. 1997. “Collusion under Asymmetric Information.”
Econometrica, 65: 875-911.
Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort. 2000. “Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correla-
tion.” Econometrica, 68: 309-342.
26
Laffont, J.-J. and D. Martimort. 2002. “The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent
Model.” Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole. 1993. “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regula-
tion.” Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
Mookherjee, D. and M. Tsumagari. 2004. “The Organization of Supplier Networks:
Effects of Delegation and Intermediation.” Econometrica, 72 (4): 1179-1219.
Pavlov, G. 2004. “Colluding on Participation Decisions.” Working Paper, Northwestern
University.
Pouyet, J. 2002. “Collusion Under Asymmetric Information: The Role of the Correla-
tion.” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 4(4): 543-572.
Quesada, L. 2005. “Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem.” Working Paper, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison.
Sappington, D. 1983. “Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and Agent.” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 29: 1-21.
Severinov, S. 2005. “The Value of Information and Optimal Organization.” Working
Paper, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
Wolak, F.A. 1994. “An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information, Regulator-
Utility Interaction.” Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, 34: 13-69.
Appendix
The proofs of proposition 2 and proposition 4 are missing because they are either well
known or straightforward.
Proof of proposition 1
In order to maximize (3) subject to (1) and (2) form,n ∈ {L,H}, we consider the relaxed
problem in which (BELL), (BELH) and (BICH) are neglected:
max (3) s.t. (BEHL), (BEHH), (BICL) (17)
We verify ex post that (BELL), (BELH) and (BICH) are satisfied by the solution of (17).
It is simple to see that (BEHL), (BEHH) and (BICL) all bind in the solution to (17).
For instance, if (BEHL) is slack then it is feasible and profitable to reduce slightly tHL.
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Likewise, if (BICL) is slack then it pays to reduce slightly tLL and/or tLH . Substitution
of the transfers obtained from these binding constraints into (3) gives the program:
max
q
pLL[S(qLL)− 2θLqLL] + 2pLH [S(qLH)− (θL + θH +
pLL
pLH
∆)qLH ]
+pHH [S(qHH)− 2(θH +
pLH
pHH
∆)qHH ]
= max
q
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn[S(qmn)− θ∗mnqmn]
The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions are: S(q∗mn) = θ
∗
mn for m,n ∈ {L,H}.
If ρ ≤ ρ∗, the inequality θ∗LH ≤ θ∗HH holds, which implies q∗LH ≥ q∗HH . In this case, the
transfers mentioned in Proposition 1 (ii) for the case of ρ ≤ ρ∗ make (BEHL), (BEHH)
and (BICL) binding and it is easy to verify that they also satisfy (BELL), (BELH) and
(BICH). If ρ > ρ∗, the inequality θ∗LH > θ
∗
HH holds, which implies q
∗
LH < q
∗
HH . The
transfers mentioned in Proposition 1 (ii) for the case of ρ > ρ∗ make (BEHL), (BEHH)
and (BICL) binding and satisfy (BELL) and (BELH). Furthermore, (BICH) is satisfied
because t∗LH − θHqLH = 0 and t∗LL− θHqLL < 0. We prove below t∗LL− θHqLL < 0. Notice
that ρ > ρ∗ is equivalent to pHHpLL > pLHpHH + 2p2LH , which implies pLH < pLL; then,
from q∗LL > q
∗
HH > q
∗
LH follows t
∗
LL − θHqLL < θLq∗LL +∆q∗LH +∆(q∗HH − q∗LH)− θHqLL =
∆(q∗HH − q∗LL) < 0.
Proof of proposition 3
(i) First, if ρ < ρ∗, then the optimal quantity schedule (q∗LL, q∗LH , q∗HH) under VS is im-
plementable under VI by using the menu of contracts M I with qILL = q
∗
LL, q
I
LH = q
∗
LH ,
qIHH = q
∗
HH and t
I
LL = 2θLq∗LL + ∆(q∗LH + q∗HH), tILH = (θH + θL)q∗LH + ∆q∗HH , tIHH =
2θHq∗HH . Moreover, the right hand side of (9) is non-negative as q∗LH ≥ q∗HH . Thus the
expected rents the principal needs to pay to implement (q∗LL, q
∗
LH , q
∗
HH) with M
I under
VI are weakly smaller than with M∗ of Proposition 1 under VS. This yields:
WS(t∗, q∗) =
?
m,n∈{L,H}
pmn[S(q
∗
mn)− (t∗mn + t∗nm)]
≤
?
m,n∈{L,H}
pmn[S(q
∗
mn)− tImn] <
?
m,n∈{L,H}
pmn[S(q
∗I
mn)− t∗Imn] =W I(t∗I , q∗I).
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (q∗LL, q
∗
LH , q
∗
HH) is different from
(q∗ILL, q
∗I
LH , q
∗I
HH). Therefore, VI dominates VS when ρ ≤ ρ∗.
Second, if ρ ≥ ρ∗∗, then the optimal quantity schedule (q∗ILL, q∗ILH , q∗IHH) under VI is
implementable under VS by using mechanismM with qLL = q∗ILL, qLH = q
∗I
LH , qHH = q
∗I
HH
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and tHH = θHq∗IHH , tHL = θHq∗ILH , tLH = θLq∗LH+∆q∗LH , tLL = θLq∗LL+∆q∗LH+
pLH
pLL
∆(q∗HH−
q∗LH). In this case the right hand side of (9) is zero because q
∗I
LH = q
∗I
HH . This implies
that the expected rent payments for implementation of (q∗ILL, q
∗I
LH , q
∗I
HH) under VI and VS
are equal. However, the principal can strictly increase her payoff under VS with respect
to (q∗ILL, q
∗I
LH , q
∗I
HH) by choosing the quantity schedule (q
∗
LL, q
∗
LH , q
∗
HH) with q
∗
LH < q
∗
HH , as
shown in proposition 1. In other words:
W I(t∗I , q∗I) =
?
m,n∈{L,H}
pmn
?
S(q∗Imn)− t∗Imn
?
=
?
m,n∈{L,H}
pmn
?
S(q∗Imn)− (tmn + tnm)
?
<
?
m,n∈{L,H}
pmn [S(q
∗
mn)− (t∗mn + t∗nm)] =W S(t∗, q∗).
in which t∗mn denotes the transfer described by Proposition 1(ii) for the case of ρ ≥ ρ∗∗.
Thus, VS dominates VI when ρ ≥ ρ∗∗.
(ii) Consider the case in which S(q) = aq − b
2
q2 with a > 0, b > 0 and, in order to
avoid corner solutions, suppose that a = S(0) is larger than the inputs’ virtual cost in
every state of nature. Notice that we need to consider only the case of ρ ∈ (ρ∗, ρ∗∗),
since otherwise the part (i) of the proposition applies. Given that S(q) = a − bq, we
find q∗mn =
1
b
(a − θ∗mn), and q∗Imn = 1b (a − θ
I
mn) for any m,n ∈ {L,H}. Furthermore,
S(1
b
(a − x)) − x1
b
(a − x) = 1
2b
(a− x)2. Thus, the expected payoff difference between
production under VS and under VI equals:
W S −W I = 1
2b
?
m,n∈{L,H}
pmn
?
(a− θ∗mn)
2 −
?
a− θImn
?2?
.
Simple but lengthy manipulations show that W S −W I has the same sign as ρ− pLH
3
(4−
3pLH − 2pLL). This motivates the definition ρ˜ ≡ pLH3 (4− 3pLH − 2pLL) and it is easy to
verify that ρ∗ < ρ˜ < ρ∗∗ holds.
Proof of proposition 5
Let Mˆ be an initial grand-mechanism offered by the principal, which satisfies the incentive
compatibility, acceptance and ex post break-even constraints. Let S• be a coalition-
interim-efficient side-contract with regard to the reservation utilities given by {U•L, U•L},
the payoffs when agents play non-cooperatively Mˆ . Suppose that S• contingent on the
offer of the grand-mechanism Mˆ gives a payoff U i(θi) to each agent i with type θi. Then,
from the interim-efficiency of the side-contract S•, we know that it satisfies the incentive
compatibility, acceptance, budget balance and ex post break-even constraints.
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Define now a new grand-mechanism Mˆ• by Mˆ ◦ S•. We note that from the interim-
efficiency of S•, the new grand-mechanism satisfies the incentive compatibility and ex post
break-even constraints. We can show that Mˆ• is weakly collusion-proof. Equivalently, it
is optimal for the third-party to offer the null side-contract.
Suppose not, then there exists an interim-efficient side-contract S¯ different from the
null side-contract, which gives a sum of expected utilities strictly higher than the one
achieved by the null side-contract. But this contradicts the coalition-interim-efficiency
of S•. Suppose S¯ contingent on the offer of the grand-mechanism Mˆ• gives a payoff
U¯ i(θi) for each agent. Then, from the interim-efficiency of S¯, it satisfies the incentive
compatibility, acceptance, budget balance and ex post break-even constraints. In partic-
ular, the following inequality holds for each i and θi: U¯ i(θi) ≥ U i(θi). Consider now the
side-contract S• ◦ S¯ contingent on the offer of the grand-mechanism Mˆ . Since we have
that U¯ i(θi) ≥ U i(θi) ≥ U•θi, S
• ◦ S¯ can be implemented by the third-party. Moreover, it
guarantees strictly higher utility at least for one agent without reducing the other’s utility
with respect to Mˆ . This contradicts the interim-efficiency of S•.
Proof of proposition 6
We show that M  is weakly collusion proof when ρ ≤ ρ∗ and M (ε) (with ε > 0 and
small) is weakly collusion proof when ρ > ρ∗. In order to prove these results, we examine
the third-party’s problem in which (BICSH) is neglected:
max
φ,y1,y2
?
m∈{L,H}
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn[t
1(φmn) + t
2(φmn)− (θm + θn)q(φmn)]
subject to
• Budget balance constraints:
y1mn + y
2
mn = 0, for any m,n ∈ {L,H} (18)
• Bayesian incentive constraint for L-type agent A1:
?
n∈{L,H}
pLn[t
1(φLn)− y1Ln − θLq(φLn)] ≥
?
n∈{L,H}
pLn[t
1(φHn)− y1Hn − θLq(φHn)] (19)
• Bayesian incentive constraint for L-type agent A2:
?
n∈{L,H}
pLn[t
2(φnL)− y2nL − θLq(φnL)] ≥
?
n∈{L,H}
pLn[t
2(φnH)− y2nH − θLq(φnH)] (20)
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• Acceptance constraint for m-type agent A1, with m ∈ {L,H}:
?
n∈{L,H}
pmn[t
1(φmn)− y1mn − θmq(φmn)] ≥ (pmL + pmH)U•m, (21)
• Acceptance constraint for m-type agent A2, with m ∈ {L,H}:
?
n∈{L,H}
pnm[t
2(φnm)− y2nm − θmq(φnm)] ≥ (pmL + pmH)U•m, (22)
• Ex post break-even constraints for an m-type agent A1 when A2 has an n-type, with
m,n ∈ {L,H}:
t1(φmn)− y1mn − θmq(φmn) ≥ 0, (23)
• Ex post break-even constraints for m-type agent A2 while A1 has an n-type, with
m,n ∈ {L,H}:
t2(φnm)− y2nm − θmq(φnm) ≥ 0, (24)
In order to define the Lagrangian function we introduce the following multipliers; we
restrict to symmetric multipliers without loss of generality:
• γmn for the budget-balance constraint if (θ1, θ2) = (θm, θn) with m,n ∈ {L,H},
• δ for the L-type’s Bayesian incentive constraint,
• vm for the m-type’s acceptance constraint with m ∈ {L,H},
• λmn for the ex post break-even constraint for agent i if θi = θm and θj = θn with
m,n ∈ {L,H}.
The Lagrangian function is given by:
L = E(U1 + U2) + ?
i∈{1,2}
δ(BICS)i(θL) +
?
m∈{L,H}
?
i∈{1,2}
vm(BIR
S)i(θm)
+
?
m,n∈{L,H}
γmn(BB)(θm, θn) +
?
m,n∈{L,H}
?
i∈{1,2}
λmn(ExPostBE)i(θm, θn).
Note that the slackness conditions obtained from the Lagrangian optimization do not
give any information on the multipliers associated with the binding constraints in the third
party’s problem. In particular, (21) and (22) bind for a weakly collusion-proof mechanism
for any m ∈ {L,H}, and therefore vL and vH can take on any non-negative values. The
same remark applies to δ, λHH and λHL if we consider any grand-mechanism which is
optimal under no collusion and weakly collusion-proof. This explains why the principal
has some flexibility in choosing μLH and μHH introduced below.
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First order conditions for side transfers The first order conditions for y1mn and y
2
mn
are
γLL − pLL(δ + vL)− λLL = 0 γHH + δpLH − pHHvH − λHH = 0
γLH + pLLδ − pLHvH − λHL = 0 γLH − pLH(δ + vL)− λLH = 0 γHL = γLH (25)
By combining the equations in (25) we obtain
vH = δ + vL +
λLH − λHL + pLLδ
pLH
(26)
The conditions under which φ•(.) = Id
• Coalition LL. Since φLL affects L through [pLL(1+δ+vL)+λLL][t1(φLL)+t2(φLL)−
2θLq(φLL)], we infer that the optimal φLL, denoted by φ
•
LL, is equal to LL if and only if
LL ∈ argmax
φLL
[t1(φLL) + t
2(φLL)− 2θLq(φLL)]. (27)
• Coalition LH (or HL). We find that L is affected by φLH through
(pLH + λLH)[t1(φLH) + t
2(φLH)− (θL + θH)q(φLH)]
+[pLH(δ + vL) + λLH ][t1(φLH)− θLq(φLH)]
+(λHL − pLLδ + pLHvH)[t2(φLH)− θHq(φLH)]
= [pLH(1 + δ + vL) + λLH ][t1(φLH) + t
2(φLH)− (θL + θH)q(φLH)]− δpLL∆q(φLH)
where the equality is a consequence of (25). Thus, φ•LH = LH is equivalent to
LH ∈ argmax
φLH
[t1(φLH) + t
2(φLH)− (θL + θH + μLH)q(φLH)], (28)
with 0 ≤ μLH ≡ δpLL∆pLH(1+δ+vL)+λLH <
pLL
pLH
∆.
• Coalition HH. Using (26), we see that φHH affects L through
pHH [1+(1+
ρ
pLHpHH
)δ+vL+
λLH − λHL
pLH
+
λHH
pHH
][t1(φHH)+t
2(φHH)−2θHq(φHH)]−2pLHδ∆q(φHH)]
Hence, as long as 1 + (1 + ρ
pLHpHH
)δ + vL + λLH−λHLpLH +
λHH
pHH
> 0, φ•HH = HH holds if and
only if
HH ∈ argmax
φHH
[t1(φHH) + t
2(φHH)− 2(θH + μHH∆)q(φHH)], (29)
with 0 ≤ μHH ≡ δpLH∆pHH [1+(1+ ρpLHpHH )δ+vL+
λLH−λHL
pLH
+
λHH
pHH
]
.
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Proof that M  is weakly collusion proof when ρ ≤ ρ∗ We set all the multipliers
equal to zero, so that (27)-(29) reduce to (11). We already know that M  satisfies (11),
and thus it is weakly collusion proof.
Proof that M (ε) is weakly collusion proof when ρ > ρ∗ We suppose that ε > 0
is small. Set λLL = λLH = λHL = λHH = 0, vL = 0, vH = pLH+pLLpLH δ, γLL = pLLδ,
γLH = γHL = pLHδ, γHH = (
ρ
pLH
+ pHH)δ; notice that these values are consistent with
the fact that (BEHL), (BELH) and (BELL) are slack in M (ε). Finally, we take δ > 0
and very large. This implies that μLH is close to
pLL
pLH
∆ and μHH is close to
p2LH
pHHpLH+ρ∆.
Then, (27) reduces
to (13)-(14) and (28), (29) are approximately equivalent to
tHL + tLH − (θL + θH +
pLL
pLH
∆)qLH ≥ 2tLL − (θL + θH +
pLL
pLH
∆)qLL (30)
tHL + tLH − (θL + θH +
pLL
pLH
∆)qLH ≥ 2tHH − (θL + θH +
pLL
pLH
∆)qHH (31)
2tHH − 2(θH +
p2LH
pHHpLH + ρ
∆)qHH ≥ 2tLL − 2(θH +
p2LH
pHHpLH + ρ
∆)qLL (32)
2tHH − 2(θH +
p2LH
pHHpLH + ρ
∆)qHH ≥ tHL + tLH − 2(θH +
p2LH
pHHpLH + ρ
∆)qLH (33)
We find that (13)-(14) are satisfied by M (ε) and that (30)-(33) hold strictly. In
particular, (33) is equivalent to −2 p
2
LH
pHHpLH+ρ∆q
∗
HH ≥ θLq∗LH + ∆q∗HH − pLLpLH∆(q
∗
HH −
q∗LH) − θHq∗LH − 2
p2LH
pHHpLH+ρ∆q
∗
LH , which reduces to 0 ≥ 1 − pLLpLH + 2
p2LH
pHHpLH+ρ , or (pLL −
pLH)(pHHpLH + ρ) ≥ 2p3LH . Since ρ > ρ∗ is equivalent to pHH(pLL − pLH) > 2p2HL, we
infer that (pLL − pLH)(pHHpLH + ρ) > 2p2LH(pLH + ρpHH ), which is larger than 2p
3
LH .
By continuity, therefore, (28) and (29) are satisfied also if μLH − pLLpLH∆ and μHH −
p2LH
pHHpLH+ρ∆ are different from zero but close to 0.
Proof of proposition 8
It is useful to consider the following payoff matrices for A1, in which A1 chooses a row
and A2 chooses a column. In (34), A1 has an H type; in (35) he has an L type
H-type :
A1\A2 L H
L u∗LL −∆q∗LL u∗LH −∆q∗LH
H u∗HL u
∗
HH
(34)
33
L-type :
A1\A2 L H
L u∗LL u
∗
LH
H u∗HL +∆q
∗
LH u
∗
HH +∆q
∗
HH
(35)
Proof that M  is strongly ratifiable when ρ ≤ ρ∗. In M , we know that u∗HL =
u∗HH = 0, while u
∗
LL −∆q∗LL = ∆
(pLL+pLH)(q
∗
LH−q∗LL)+pLH(q∗HH−q∗LL)
pLL+2pLH
< 0 and u∗LH −∆q∗LH =
∆2pLH(q
∗
HH−q
∗
LH)
pLL+2pLH
< 0. Furthermore, we have u∗LL < ∆q
∗
LH , u
∗
LH > ∆q
∗
HH and u
∗
LL > u
∗
LH .
Therefore, for A1H (as well as for A
2
H) it is strictly dominant to report truthfully. This
implies that A1H cannot gain from vetoing S
0. About A1L, we know that A
2
H will play
H; A2L plays L with probability α and H with probability 1 − α. If α = 1, then A1L
is indifferent between L and H; his payoff is U•L. If α < 1, then A1L prefers L because
u∗LH > ∆q
∗
HH and his payoff is smaller than U•L because u∗LL > u∗LH . Thus, there is no
BNE of M  (let alone beliefs which support it) in which A1L earns more than U
•
L.
Proof that M (ε) is strongly ratifiable when ρ > ρ∗. In this case we still have
u∗LL−∆q∗LL < 0 and u∗LH −∆q∗LH < u∗HH = 0, but uHL = ε. Hence, A2H certainly plays H
and A1H ’s payoff cannot be higher than U•H =
pLH
pLH+pHH
ε. Furthermore, u∗LL > u∗HL+∆q∗LH
and u∗LH < ∆q
∗
HH . As above, we denote with α the probability that A2L plays L. In order
for A1L to gain more than U
∗
L, it is necessary that α < 1 and this makes A1L prefer report
H over L because u∗LH < ∆q
∗
HH . In this case, A
1
L plays H and the best reply for A
2
L is to
report H. Thus, the unique credible veto system is such that A1L rejects S
0 (his payoff is
higher after rejection) while A1H does not reject because he earns zero by rejecting, which
is smaller than U•H . The updated beliefs are as described in the proposition. However,
we can prove that σ• is a BNE of M (ε) also with these beliefs: σ• ∈ BNE(M p¯,p(ε)).
Indeed, it is clear that truth-telling is a best reply for A1L and A
1
H , since A
1 has prior
beliefs on θ2. Furthermore, since u∗LL > ε+∆q∗LH , truth-telling is a best reply also for A2L
and A2H . Hence, σ• is a BNE of M p¯,p(ε). Since A1L has prior beliefs on θ
2, we have that
U1L(σ•) = U•L and we conclude that M (ε) is strongly ratifiable.
34
